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Changing Concepts in the World's Mineral and 
Petroleum Development Laws* 
Northcutt Ely** 
and 
Robert F. Pietrowski, Jr. *** 
The modern systems of laws governing mineral and petro- 
leum development are simply the current phase in the centuries- 
old evolution of relationships between the consumer, the ruler, 
the landowner, and the miner. In 1912, Herbert Hoover and his * 
wife, Lou Henry Hoover, described these relationships in a foot- 
note attached to their translation of Agricola's classic mining law 
treatise, De Re Meta1lica;l their comment is particularly apropos 
today to the problems faced today by the international mining 
and petroleum industries: 
There is no branch of the law of property of which the 
development is more interesting and illuminating from a social 
point of view than that relating to minerals. Unlike the land, the 
minerals have ever been regarded as a sort of fortuitous prop- 
erty, for the title of which there have been four principal claim- 
ants-that is, the Overlord, as represented by the King, Prince, 
Bishop, or what not; the Community or the State, as distin- 
guished from the Ruler; the Landowner; and the Mine Operator, 
to which class belongs the Discoverer. The one of these that 
possessed the dominant right reflects vividly the social state and 
sentiment of the period. The Divine Right of Kings; the measure 
of freedom of their subjects; the tyranny of the land-owning 
class; the rights of the Community as opposed to its individual 
members; the rise of individualism; and finally, the modern 
return to more communal view, have all been reflected promptly 
in the mineral title. Of these parties the claims of the Overlord 
have been limited only by the resistance of his subjects; those 
* This essay was originally presented by Northcutt Ely as an address to the Interna- 
tional Bar Association's Seminar on World Energy Laws, May 6, 1975, in Stavangar, 
Norway. 
** B.A., Stanford University; J.D., Stanford University; Member, District of Colum- 
bia Bar. 
*** B.S. in Petroleum Engineering, St.anford University; J.D., University of Virginia; 
Member, District of Columbia Bar. 
1. G .  AGRICOLA, DERE METALLICA (H. Hoover & L. Hoover transls. 1912). 
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of the State limited by the landlord; those of the landlord by the 
Sovereign or by the State; while the miner, ever in a minority 
in influence as well as in  numbers, has been buffeted from pillar 
to post, his only protection being the fact that all other parties 
depend upon his exertion and skill.* 
The miner's position vis-a-vis the overlord, the state, and the 
landlord has changed very little since the Hoovers wrote the 
above-quoted passage. 
In order to understand the changing concepts of the world's 
mineral development laws, it is useful to review the antecedents 
of those laws. We do not know when man first learned the use of 
metals, but we know that mining dates back at  least to the Neo- 
lithic age. Durant writes: 
[I]n the ruins of a neolithic mine a t  Brandon, England, eight 
worn picks of deerhorn were found, on whose dusty surfaces were 
the finger-prints of the workmen who had laid down those tools 
ten thousand years ago. In Belgium the skeleton of such a New 
Stone Age miner, who had been crushed by falling rock, was 
discovered with his deerhorn pick still clasped in his hands; 
across a hundred centuries we feel him as one of us, and share 
in weak imagination his terror and agony. Through how many 
bitter millenniums men have been tearing out of the bowels of 
the earth the mineral bases of ci~il ization!~ 
Very little is known of mining in the ancient civilizations 
which predated Greece. We know, however, that in ancient Egypt 
mines were the property of the pharoah, and mining was a govern- 
ment monopoly. The Egyptians operated mines in Arabia and 
Nubia, and worked these mines with slave labor. It is also known 
that oil pitch was mined in ancient Babylonia and that silver was 
minted into coins in Assyria. But it is not until the Greek civiliza- 
tion that we have any record of mining laws. A mining industry 
flourished in ancient Greece from 700 B.C. to 200 B.C. Mineral 
ownership was governed by the "regalian system," that is, miner- 
als were considered to be the property of the state, regardless of 
who owned the overlying ~ u r f a c e . ~  Mining rights, however, were 
2. Id. at 82 (emphasis added). 
3. W. DURANT, 1 THE STORY OF CIVILIZATION: OUR ORIENTAL HERITAGE 100 (1954). 
4. A distinction is often made between ownership of minerals by the state and control 
of exploration and production by the state. Where this distinction is made, the former is 
referred to as the "dominal system;" the latter, the "regalian system." 
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granted to private individuals. The area of the mining right was 
defined by vertical boundaries, and the term of the right was from 
3 to 10 years, depending on whether the mine had been worked 
previously. The miner was required to meet certain work obliga- 
tions and to pay the state a royalty of one twenty-fourth of the 
net profits from his operation; the surface owner received nothing. 
The Greeks had an elaborate (for the times) mining administra- 
tion. A director of mines considered applications from individuals 
seeking mining rights and determined where such individuals 
might prospeQ for ore. Matters such as location with reference to 
the direction and extent of veins and the proper distance between 
different claims in the same area were governed by regulations. 
In early Roman law, a fundamentally different form of min- 
eral ownership prevailed. Ownership of the surface carried with 
it the ownership of any minerals beneath the surface. This theory 
of mineral ownership is generally known as the "accession sys- 
tem." This term is derived from the concept of minerals "acced- 
ing" to the surface owner upon discovery. Notwithstanding the 
fact that the accession system existed under early Roman law, the 
legacy of the Roman Empire for mining systems in the modern 
world was not the accession system, but rather the regalian sys- 
tem. This resulted from the fact that the great majority of mines 
and known mineral deposits outside of Italy were acquired by 
conquest, and hence became the property of the Republic, and 
later the Empire. Due to this extensive state ownership of mines, 
the underlying theory that the state holds primary control over 
all mineral resources became accepted. Many of the Roman Em- 
pire's state-owned mines were worked by private individuals and 
companies operating under licenses granted by the state. Other 
mines were worked directly by state enterprises. As in Greece, 
there was a formal administrative system to handle mining mat- 
ters. Mining districts were established and placed under the au- 
thority of an official called the Procurator Metallorum, who was 
responsible for the granting of mining rights within his district. 
The fall of the Western Roman Empire in the fifth century 
A.D. occasioned the breakdown of central government in Western 
Europe with an accompanying breakdown of European mining 
law systems. During the Middle Ages, Europe was governed by 
hundreds of feudal lords who generally claimed ownership of the 
minerals within their respective areas of authority. Warfare 
among these feudal lords was common, and was often caused by 
disputes over mines. Because of this deterioration in mining law 
and administration, mining as an industry was generally neg- 
lected during the Middle Ages. 
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By the 12th century, however, mining "communities" had 
developed in Germany; by the 13th century, in England. The 
customs that evolved in the mining communities of these two 
nations would play an important part in the mining law of the 
United States and, ultimately, in the laws of numerous other 
modern nations. 
The customs of the German mining communities, confirmed 
in the communities' charters, gave rise to the concept of "free 
mining," under which a miner was "free" to enter the land of 
another to prospect for or exploit mineral resources. The system 
of mineral ownership was regalian, and the miner could acquire 
a lease from the overlord to develop an ore body by compliance 
with certain rules. These rules provided several incentives for 
discovery. First, the discoverer was given a right to work the ore 
body which was superior to the rights of anyone else. Second, the 
discoverer was granted a larger area within which to exercise his 
mining rights than were other minem5 In return for the right to 
mine, the miner paid a tribute or royalty to the Crown and, if he 
was operating upon private lands, he paid an additional tribute 
to the landlord. He was also obligated to work diligently and 
continuously; failure to do so could result in the forfeiture of his 
mining right. 
Another important development in mining law originating in 
these early German mining communities is the "apex" concept 
of title. Under the apex concept, the miner is permitted an "ex- 
tralateral right" to pursue a vein in its downward dip, regardless 
of the surface boundaries. This concept flows logically from the 
idea that the surface and mineral estates are two quite different 
things. 
Customary rules of mining law also developed in certain Eng- 
lish mining communities. In England, the general rule, under the 
common law, was that minerals were the property of the surface 
owner, except for gold, silver, and minerals beneath navigable 
waters (including the seas), all of which belonged to the Crown. 
In certain parts of England, however, such as Cornwall, Derby- 
shire, Devon, and the Forest of Dean, ownership of all minerals 
was considered to vest in the Crown, subject to long-established 
customs which created certain rights in the miner. As to the 
origin of these customs, Lindley writes: 
5. A discoverer was awarded a "head meer," which measured approximately 294 feet 
along the length of the vein by 42 feet. Other miners were granted a "regular meer," which 
measured 84 feet by 42 feet. 
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These customs undoubtedly had their origin during the 
Roman occupation; but they were recognized and established by 
acts of parliament upon the theory that they existed by virtue 
of some antecedent grant or concession made by the crown." 
These mining communities developed unique rules of mining law. 
For example, in Cornwall, tin miners were given a free right of 
entry. A "free tinner" could establish his "bound" by marking an 
area (usually about an acre) a t  the four corners with stones or 
pieces of turf. This bound was then announced in the stannary 
courts;' if no objection was heard, the court issued a writ of pos- 
session. The miner was then entitled to search for and extract ore 
within the area of his bound, subject to certain regulations. He 
was required to maintain continuous operations, to renew his 
bound annually, and to pay a royalty called a "dish" or "toll7' to 
the owner of the surface. Tin bounds could be sold or demised, 
and were liable for the payment of debts. Similar customary rules 
developed in Devon (tin), in Derbyshire (lead), where the apex 
concept was recognized, and in the Forest of Dean (coal and iron). 
Until the end of the 18th century, the civil law of Spain was 
similar to that of common law England. It was stated by Gamboa 
as follows: 
By the civil law, all veins and mineral deposits of gold or 
silver ore, or of precious stones, belonged, if in public ground to 
the sovereign, and were part of his patrimony; but if in private 
property, they belonged to the owner of the land, subject to the 
condition, that if worked by the owner, he was bound to render 
a tenth part of the produce to the prince as a right attaching to 
his crown; and if worked by any other person, by consent of the 
owner, the former was liable to the payment of two-tenths, one 
to the prince and one to the owner. 
Subsequently, it became an established custom in most 
kingdoms, and was declared by the particular laws and statutes 
of each, that all veins of the precious metals, and the produce 
of such veins, should vest in the crown, and be held to be a part 
of the patrimony of the king or sovereign p r i n ~ e . ~  
Then, on May 23, 1783, King Charles 111 of Spain issued a royal 
ordinance that declared all mines to be the property of the Crown, 
T c .  LINDLEY, 1 A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW RELATING TO MINES AND MINERAL 
LANDS 9 (3d ed. 1914). 
7. The mining communities were chartered as corporations called "stannaries" and 
granted legislative, executive, and judicial powers. The courts of the communities were 
known as "stannary courts." 
8. F. GAMBOA, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF MINING 15 (1830). 
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without regard to the type of mineral or the location thereof. This 
ordinance brought nearly all of the Spanish colonies in America 
under the regalian system. 
Under this later Spanish system, a subject of the Crown 
could "deno~nce"~ a mine upon the property of any individual, 
provided that adequate compensation was paid to the surface 
owner. A grant by the Crown vested in the grantee the right to 
possession and occupation, with a further right to dispose of the 
grant on the same two conditions as those under which it had 
been received: (1) payment to the Crown of a royalty of one-fifth 
of the minerals produced, and (2) compliance with relevant regu- 
lations prescribed by ordinance. Failure to comply with these 
regulations resulted in forfeiture of the property, after which it 
became subject to denouncement. Further, the Spanish system 
protected the surface owner from potential damage to his prop- 
erty to the extent that he was entitled to compensation for its use. 
Also, judicial proceedings were provided to resolve conflicting 
claims as to priority of discovery or registration. 
In France, a somewhat different theory of mineral ownership 
developed. Prior to the French Revolution, the accession system 
prevailed. During the Revolution, however, the landowners were 
forced to renounce their rights to minerals beneath their lands to 
the state, and the law of July 28, 1791 reserved to the state the 
right to regulate mineral exploration and production. This right 
was reaffirmed in the mining law of 1810 and incorporated in the 
Napoleonic Code. Under the French system, ownership of the 
mineral deposit does not vest in the surface owner; rather, the 
deposit is res nullius until discovered and reduced to effective 
possession. The state retains the absolute right to determine who 
shall develop the mineral deposit. A vestige of the landowner's 
former right to subsurface minerals remains in the form of a right 
to a royalty. 
Much of the world's mineral wealth has been developed by 
American companies operating in foreign countries under agree- 
ments with the host governments. Most of these agreements re- 
flect some aspect of U.S. mining or petroleum legislation, because 
the terms were bargained for by American companies accustomed 
to operating under that legislation. Therefore, before considering 
9. A "denouncement" is a type of tenure similar to the American mining claim. 
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the various forms these agreements may take, let us first look 
briefly a t  mining and petroleum legislation in the United States. 
Systems of mineral ownership in the United States are rather 
complicated and not a t  all uniform. As a general rule, the mineral 
estate is part of the surface estate and passes with it, unless and 
until severed. Title to minerals may be held by the federal gov- 
ernment, a state government, or an individual, initially as a con- 
sequence of ownership of the surface. 
When the Thirteen Original Colonies achieved independence 
from England in 1776, they individually took title to large tracts 
of public land, some within their established boundaries but most 
of it far to the west. The colonies ceded to the federal government 
upon the signing of the Articles of Confederation all lands 
claimed by them west of their established borders. These lands 
were the beginning of what came to be known as the public do- 
main. The Ordinance of 1785,1° the first land legislation adopted 
by the Continental Congress, provided for the fee simple sale of 
lands within the public domain. Following the enactment of the 
Federal Constitution in 1789, Congress reaffirmed in a 1796 act 
the principle that public domain could be transferred in fee sim- 
ple." This act made no provision for the reservation of mineral 
rights to the federal government, and Congress made no change 
in this policy until the Pre-emption Act in 1841.12 Between 1796 
and 1841, vast areas of land were added to the public domain as 
a consequence of territorial acquisitions by the United States, 
namely, the Louisiana Purchase of 1803 and the Treaty with 
Spain of 1819. During this period, the policy of the United States 
was to sell public land to individuals for revenue, and numerous 
sales were made without reservation of minerals to the federal 
government. 
Reservation of minerals to the federal government com- 
menced with the Pre-emption Act of 1841, which provided that 
"no lands on which are situated any known salines or mines shall 
be liable to entry under and by virtue of the provisions of this 
act."13 I t  is important to note that the reservation provided for in 
the Pre-emption Act was not simply a reservation of minerals or 
mines, but rather a reservation of lands on which mines or miner- 
10. 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 375 (1785). 
11. Act of May 18, 1796, ch. 29, 0 0 1-12, 1 Stat. 464 (codified in scattered sections of 
30 U.S.C.). 
12. Act of Sept. 4, 1841, ch. 16, 00 1-17, 5 Stat. 456 (codified in scattered sections of 
30 U.S.C.). 
13. Id. 0 10. 
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als exist. Thus, Congress rejected the separation of the mineral 
estate from the surface estate that characterized European sys- 
tems of mineral development.14 Although the severance of the 
mineral estate from the surface estate was common on nonfederal 
lands, Congress refused to recognize the severance of the two 
estates until 1916, when it passed the Stock-Raising Homestead 
Act.15 
Subsequent to the Pre-emption Act of 1841, more land was 
added to the public domain by the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo 
with Mexico in 1848, the Gadsden Purchase from Mexico in 1853, 
the Northwest Compromise with Britain of 1846 and 1872, and 
the purchase of Alaska from Russia in 1867. Congress granted 
large portions of this public domain to states and to railroads as 
a bonus for construction of their lines. Lands known to contain 
minerals at the date of the grant were excluded and remained 
under federal ownership, but if minerals were subsequently dis- 
covered, the grantee was recognized as holding title to both the 
surface and the minerals. 
Notwithstanding the reservation of mineral lands to the fed- 
eral government in 1841, Congress failed to pass any general legis- 
lation for the development of the reserved minerals until 1866. 
Consequently, when gold was discovered on federal lands in Cali- 
fornia in 1848, there was no positive law to regulate the thousands 
of miners who flocked to the Sacramento Valley. These miners 
occupied federal land technically as trespassers but with federal 
acquiescence. The miners themselves soon recognized the need 
for some form of regulation. Mining districts were organized and 
local rules were adopted. These rules reflected customs reminis- 
cent of those developed centuries earlier in the mining communi- 
ties of England and Germany, but efforts to trace a direct line of 
descent have not been altogether successful. The right of property 
in mines was made dependent upon discovery and development; 
discovery was the source of the right, but its continuance was 
conditioned upon working and developing the mine. The rules 
adopted by  the California miners also recognized the apex princi- 
ple, that is, the right to work a vein down the dip to an indefinite 
depth without regard to lateral surface boundaries. 
In 1866, Congress enacted the first general mining legislation 
14. The Continental Congress, however, recognized the mineral estate and surface 
estate as separate estates. 28 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 375, 378 (1785). 
15. 43 U.S.C. $8  291-301 (1970) (originally enacted as Enlarged Homestead Act of 
1916, ch. 9, $ 0  1-11, 39 Stat.. 862). 
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in the United States? This act announced three important 
principles: (1) all mineral lands in the public domain should be 
free and open to exploration and occupation; (2) rights to mineral 
deposits in the public domain acquired under local rules, where 
there was apparent acquiescence by the government, should be 
recognized and confirmed; and (3) title to these mineral deposits 
might ultimately be obtained upon compliance with certain sta- 
tutory procedures. In 1872, Congress passed additional mining 
legislation dealing with the patenting of lode and placer mining 
claims. l7 
The Acts of 1866 and 1872 are still in effect. These, together 
with the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920, ls which governs the acquisi- 
tion of rights to nonmetallic minerals on the public domain, still 
form the basic federal mineral legislation in the United States. 
Under the 1866 and 1872 Acts, any person may enter upon public 
land to explore for minerals. Upon discovery (valid discovery is 
the basis of mineral rights), the miner is required to "locate" his 
discovery by marking the location on the ground so that  its 
boundaries can be easily traced. The precise manner of location 
is prescribed by statute and differs for lodes and placers. The 
number of mining claims that may be located by an individual, 
corporation, or association is unlimited, provided each location 
contains a discovery. Once a valid discovery and location have 
been made, the miner has acquired a vested interest in the min- 
ing claim and may extract minerals therefrom. If he wishes to 
obtain title to the lands covered by his location, the miner must 
seek a patent from the United States. Patent applications are 
processed by the Bureau of Land Management of the Department 
of the Interior. A payment is required to secure the patent, but it 
is not related to the mineral value of the lands. There is no royalty 
payment requirement. In the event of an adverse claim of right 
by another party, the respective rights of the claimants may be 
determined in any federal or state court having competent juris- 
diction. As a general rule, priority of discovery governs as between 
claimants. After the miner has complied with the procedural re- 
quirements and has paid the purchase price for his claim, he 
receives a certificate which has the effect of vesting equitable title 
16. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 1-11, 14 Stat. 251 (codified in scattered sections 
of 30 U.S.C.). 
17. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 152, 4 4  1-16, 17 Stat. 91 (codified in scattered sections 
of 30 U.S.C.). 
18. Act of Feb. 5, 1920, ch. 85, 9 § 1-38, 41 Stat. 437 (codified in scattered sections of 
30 U.S.C.). 
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to the property in him. Subsequent issuance of the patent vests 
complete title, legal and equitable, in the miner and relates back 
to the inception of the right, that is, to the date of discovery and 
location. The patent conveys title not only to the mineral estate 
but to the surface estate as well. 
The location system provides the individual miner with an 
incentive to undertake exploration activities. This system was 
largely responsible for the development of the vast mineral wealth 
of the Western United States, and it remains the basis of Ameri- 
can mining law relating to hard minerals. Outside of the United 
States, however, the location system is seldom encountered 
today. 
Oil, gas, and other nonmetallic minerals located on federal 
lands are regulated by the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920. On the 
public domain, such minerals are not subject to location and 
patent and may be developed only under a lease. If land lies 
within the known geologic structure of a producing oil or gas field, 
a lease may be awarded only by competitive bidding. Otherwise, 
no competitive bidding is required, and the lease will be issued 
to the first applicant. Competitive leases may be issued for areas 
not exceeding 640 acres and for a primary term of 5 years and so 
long thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. 
The primary term will not be extended unless at the time of its 
expiration actual drilling operations are being conducted, in 
which case the term may be extended for 2 years and as long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities. Royal- 
ties payable to the United States under competitive leases may 
not be less than one-eighth of the amount or value of production, 
and may be higher if specified in the notice of sale and the lease. 
The annual rental is $2 per acre prior to discovery, unless a differ- 
ent rate is specified in the lease. Special royalty and rental provi- 
sions apply to leases in Alaska. Bids are on a cash bonus basis, 
and leases are awarded to the highest qualified bidder. 
Noncompetitive leases, which are issued for lands that do not 
lie within the known geologic structure of a producing field, may 
be acquired by filing an application with the Bureau of Land 
Management. A noncompetitive lease grants an exclusive right to 
conduct operations in an area not exceeding 2,560 acres for a 
primary term of 10 years and as long thereafter as oil and gas is 
produced in paying quantities. Absent discovery in commercial 
quantities, the primary term will not be extended unless actual 
drilling is taking place a t  the time of expiration, in which case an 
extension may be allowed for 2 years and as long thereafter as oil 
91 CHANGING CONCEPTS 19 
and gas is produced in paying quantities. The federal government 
receives a one-eighth royalty on a noncompetitive lease, payable 
on any oil or gas production under the lease. Annual rentals for 
noncompetitive leases are $0.50 per acre. Special provisions apply 
to noncompetitive leases issued prior to September 2, 1960. 
Under both competitive and noncompetitive leases, the les- 
see acquires ownership of the mineral production of the lease. The 
lessee's rights to the surface area are limited, however, to the use 
of the area necessary to his mineral operations, and the United 
States reserves the right to dispose of the remaining surface area 
by sale, lease, or other manner. The Secretary of the Interior is 
authorized to provide in the lease for due diligence and the pre- 
vention of waste. 
The Mineral Leasing Act does not apply to federal lands 
acquired after February 25, 1920. In 1947, however, Congress en- 
acted the Acquired Lands Act,l%hich authorized the Secretary 
of the Interior to lease "acquired lands," that is, lands acquired 
by the United States not subject to the Mineral Leasing Act, 
under the same terms and conditions as provided for in the Min- 
eral Leasing Act. The Acquired Lands Act applies only to those 
minerals covered by the Mineral Leasing Act, that is, nonmetallic 
minerals. Nevertheless, leases of mining rights for hard minerals 
on acquired lands may be obtained if provided for in either the 
statute under which the particular lands were acquired or the 
statutes applicable to the federal agency having jurisdiction over 
the particular lands. The location laws do not apply to acquired 
lands. 
With respect to offshore mineral development, the Sub- 
merged Lands Act of 195320 vests mineral jurisdiction in seabed 
areas beneath the territorial waters of the United States in the 
adjacent individual state. Beyond these territorial waters, the 
jurisdiction is federalz1 and mineral development is regulated by 
the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953.2z Under that Act, 
leases in offshore areas beyond United States territorial waters 
are awarded by competitive bidding. The Secretary has authority 
to either (1) fix the royalty a t  not less than 12.5 percent and 
19. 30 U.S.C. § §  351 & note, 352-59 (1970) (originally enacted in 1947 as Mineral 
Leasing Act for Acquired Lands ch. 513, § §  1-10, 61 Stat. 913). 
20. 43 U.S.C. $§ 1301-1303, 1311-1315 (1970) (originally enacted in 1953 as Sub- 
merged Lands Act ch. 65, §§ 1-11, 67 Stat. 29). 
21. United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975). 
22. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-43 (1970) (originally enacted in 1953 as Outer Continental Shelf 
Lands Act ch. 345, §§ 1-17, 67 Stat. 462). 
20 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
accept bids on the cash bonus, or (2) fix the cash bonus and 
accept bids on the royalty. Leases are awarded to the highest 
qualified bidder. Leases may be awarded for an area not exceed- 
ing 5,760 acres and for a term not exceeding 5 years and as long 
thereafter as oil and gas is produced in paying quantities, or for 
as long thereafter as drilling or other operations approved by the 
Secretary are conducted. 
With respect to seabed areas that are beyond the jurisdiction 
of the United States and other nations, there is presently pending 
in both houses of Congress legislation that would permit and 
regulate mining operations by United States companies.23 The 
jurisdictional bases of this legislation are the freedom of the seas 
doctrine and the universally recognized principle that a sovereign 
state may regulate the activities of its nationals on the high seas. 
Under the Multiple Use Acts of 195424 and 1955,25 the devel- 
opment of mineral resources on public lands may go forward on 
the same tract of land under both the mining laws of the United 
States and the Mineral Leasing Act. Thus, the Acts opened up 
some 60 million acres of public lands previously under oil and gas 
leases to location for hard minerals. At the same time, the Acts 
authorized operations for leasable minerals on lands which pre- 
viously had been opened to location under the mining laws. 
Although most federally owned land is subject to mineral 
entry and development under the various laws described above, 
certain types of federal land are not. For example, Indian reserva- 
tions may not be entered under the general mining and leasing 
laws; minerals on Indian lands must be developed under a special 
system of federal laws relating to such lands. Other types of fed- 
eral land subject to restrictions or special provisions relating to 
mineral development include military reservations, national 
parks, national forests, reclamation withdrawals, and reserva- 
tions made under the Federal Power Act. 
The methods of acquiring mineral interests in state lands are 
prescribed by the respective state  legislature^.^^ In most cases, 
23. S. 713,94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (reported by the Oceanography Subcomm. of 
the House Comm. on Merchant Marine and Fisheries on March 16, 1976); H.R. 11,879, 
94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) (reported by the full Senate Interior Comm. on March 18,1976. 
24. 30 U.S.C. 9 9 521 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as Multiple Use Law of 1954, 
ch. 730, $ 9  1-13, 68 Stat. 708). 
25. 30 U.S.C. §§  611 et seq. (1970) (originally enacted as  Act of July 23, 1955, ch. 
375, 9 9 1-7, 69 Stat. 367). 
26. It should be noted that none of the federal mining legislation in the United States 
applies to areas within Texas. Unlike other territorial acquisitions of the United States, 
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state lands have been disposed of without any reservation of min- 
erals. In some instances, however, states have granted leases for 
lands believed to contain valuable minerals. 
On privately owned lands, ownership of the mineral estate 
vests in the owner of the surface estate, unless and until severed. 
Thus, a prospective mineral developer on privately owned land 
must negotiate with the private owner for any rights he wishes to 
obtain. Transfer of mineral rights and titles among private own- 
ers is accomplished within the legal framework of each state relat- 
ing to property titles, sales and conveyances, leases, licenses, and 
contracts. 
Most of the onshore oil and gas in the United States has been 
discovered on private lands and, hence, is not subject to the fed- 
eral Mineral Leasing Act. Oil and gas operations on nonfederal 
private lands are, however, regulated by state laws. Authority to 
regulate such operations is derived from the states' police power. 
State regulation is usually based on the concept of "proration- 
ing," under which an administrative determination is made con- 
cerning the quantity that a field may produce per day. That  
quantity is then apportioned among the wells in the particular 
field.27 States, as an exercise of their police powers, may also 
regulate the spacing and drilling of wells. The purpose of such 
state legislation is to prevent waste and protect the correlative 
rights of the common owners of an oil and gas pool. 
Most of the world's proved petroleum reserves have been 
discovered by companies operating under some form of petroleum 
concession. A concession is essentially a contractual agreement 
between a company and a government that  confers certain rights 
and corresponding obligations upon both parties. A concession is 
also a document of title against which money can be borrowed. 
But most of the concessions in force today bear little resemblance 
to those which opened up the vast oil fields of the Middle East, 
North Africa, and Latin America during the first half of this 
century. And, as we shall see, the present trend is toward quite 
the acquisition of the Republic of Texas produced no federal public domain. When Texas 
entered the Union, it retained title to all the public land within its boundaries. Conse- 
quently, the vast mineral resources of that state-including the oil and gas resources- 
have been developed entirely under state law. 
27. Of the major oil-producing states in the United States, only California has no 
prorationing system. 
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different relationships between host country and foreign investor. 
The first successful petroleum concession in the Middle East 
was the famous D'Arcy Concession, which was granted by Persia 
to William Knox D'Arcy, an Englishman, in 1901. Under the 
terms of this concession, D'Arcy was given the exclusive right to 
explore for and exploit the petroleum resources of Persia, except 
for five northern provinces, for a period of 60 years. D'Arcy was 
also granted the exclusive right to lay pipelines in the concession 
area, and was given exemption from all Persian taxes. In return, 
D'Arcy agreed to form an exploitation company within 2 years, 
and to pay the Persian government a royalty of 16 percent of the 
company's profits. D'Arcy also paid a cash bonus of £ 20,000, and 
agreed to give the government a £20,000 interest in the exploita- 
tion company. The parties further agreed that, upon expiration 
of the concession, title to all of the company's immovable prop- 
erty would pass to the government without charge. 
Although these terms are modest by present-day standards, 
they must be judged in the context of the investment climate that 
prevailed in Persia in 1901. I t  was not known at  that time whether 
marketable quantities of oil even existed in Persia. The Persian 
government was weak, corrupt, and heavily in debt. Large parts 
of the country were controlled by local tribal chiefs who did not 
recognize the government's authority. In nearby Mesopotamia, 
concessions owned by Germany's Deutsche Bank had recently 
been nationalized by the Turkish government without compensa- 
tion. Consequently, Western financiers were not interested in 
risking capital in Persian oil ventures. It is doubtful that conces- 
sion terms significantly more favorable to the government would 
have induced anyone to attempt to develop Persia's petroleum 
resources. Indeed, even under the terms of the 1901 concession, 
D'Arcy's operations were plagued by financial crisis on more than 
one occasion. D'Arcy spent over £200,000 of his own money on 
exploration efforts without success. When he was unable to raise 
additional capital, he formed a joint venture with Burmah Oil 
Company, which agreed to provide the capital required to con- 
tinue operations under the concession agreement. Oil was finally 
discovered in 1908, and a new exploitation company called Anglo- 
Persian was formed to develop and produce the discovery. Even 
the capital resources of Anglo-Persian proved insufficient to ex- 
ploit Persia's oil, however. It was not until the British government 
agreed to provide £ 2,000,000 in return for a majority interest in 
Anglo-Persian that the company was able to raise the capital 
necessary to develop the Persian resources. 
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In the meantime, a revolution had occurred in Turkey and 
several companies had begun to negotiate concession rights with 
the new government. These negotiations were terminated by 
World War I, which resulted in the dissolution of the Turkish 
Empire. Following the war, the companies began negotiating with 
the newly formed government of Iraq, which now had jurisdiction 
over the area of interest. In 1925, Iraq entered into a concession 
agreement with a consortium called the Turkish Petroleum Com- 
pany (later, the Iraq Petroleum Company), owned by an Ameri- 
can group, Anglo-Persian, Shell, CFP (French), and the Gul- 
benkian interest. This concession agreement is of particular im- 
portance because it served as a model for other concession agree- 
ments in the Middle East and elsewhere. As amended in 1931, the 
concession granted the company the exclusive right to explcre for 
and exploit petroleum resources in an  area of approximately 
35,000 square miles for a period of 75 years. In addition, the 
company was exempted from all Iraqi taxes. The company agreed 
to pay a royalty of 4 shillings gold on each ton (approximately 7 
American barrels) of oil produced, with a minimum annual 
royalty of f400,000 gold. (After 1932, payments were made in 
sterling, based on the prevailing price of gold in the London mar- 
ket.) The company also agreed to make tax commutation pay- 
ments of f9,000 gold per annum until exports began, and there- 
after payments of ;E60,000 gold for the first 4 million tons of ex- 
port, and f 20,000 gold for each additional million tons of export. 
The company agreed to commence exploration within 8 months 
and to build a pipeline system with a capacity of not less than 3 
million tons per year. The company further agreed that the pipe- 
line and all other immovable property would be surrendered with- 
out charge to the government upon termination of the concession. 
Subsequent to the 1925 agreement between Iraq and the 
Turkish Petroleum group, there was a proliferation of concession 
agreements in the Middle East and north Africa. These conces- 
sions were generally quite simple and were characterized by the 
following terms: 
(1) The rights granted were exclusive, and usually included 
the right to explore for, develop, produce, transport, refine, sell, 
and export petroleum and natural gas. 
(2) The principal form of compensation to the host govern- 
ment was a royalty, which was usually fixed a t  4 shillings gold or 
3 rupees per ton of crude produced and saved. Some of the conces- 
sions also provided for rents, bonuses, and tax commutation 
payments. The company was usually exempt from all taxes. 
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(3) The concession area was generally quite large, some- 
times covering the entire country. 
(4) The duration of the concession was typically from 60 to 
75 years. 
(5) The company was allowed to import into the host coun- 
try all machinery, materials, and other property necessary to its 
petroleum operations free of import duties and restrictions. 
(6) Failure to meet contract obligations resulting from the 
occurrence of force majeure was not considered a breach of con- 
tract. 
(7) Disputes were settled by arbitration. One arbitrator was 
appointed by the government and one by the company. The two 
appointed arbitrators would attempt to agree on a third. Failing 
agreement, the third arbitrator was selected by a designated indi- 
vidual, typically a judge on the World Court. Arbitral decisions 
were by majority vote. 
These conclusions did not make provision for production lev- 
els or prices of crude oil. By implication, the rights to control 
production and prices vested -in the companies. This situation 
-company control of production and prices-would, in the 
years to come, cause such discontent among oil-producing na- 
tions as to ultimately bring about an end to the concession sys- 
tem. 
IV. JOINT VENTURE AND PARTICIPATION AGREEMENTS: HE DEMISE 
OF THE CONCESSION SYSTEM 
Almost from the start, the governments of the oil-producing 
countries sought to improve upon the terms in their concession 
agreements. Persia, for example, became disenchanted with the 
royalty provision in its agreement with Anglo-Persian since the 
royalty, although a generous (for the times) 16 percent, was tied 
to the company's profits. If the company was unable to make a 
profit on its Persian operations, the government received no roy- 
alty income. In Iraq, the government attempted to insert a 20 
percent participation provision in its concession agreement with 
the Turkish Petroleum Company. The host governments, how- 
ever, lacked the bargaining power necessary to impose more fa- 
vorable terms on the companies. During the 1930's, there was a 
surplus of oil on the world market, so a threat to curtail produc- 
tion lacked much of the force it would have today. Furthermore, 
there were relatively few companies holding oil concessions in the 
1930's, and competition between those companies for concessions 
was minimal. Consequently, the governments were unable to ob- 
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tain better terms by playing the companies off against one an- 
other. Also, these companies controlled downstream operations, 
and a government that nationalized its concessions ran the risk 
that i t  would be unable to market its oil. 
The first successful government demand for greater revenues 
from an existing concession came not in the Middle East but in 
Venezuela. Company-government relations in that country began 
to deteriorate in 1936 following the death of General Juan Vin- 
cente Gomez, who had originally granted the concessions to the 
companies. During World War 11, the government's bargaining 
position improved as the allies became increasingly dependent on 
Venezuelan oil, and in 1943, Venezuela began imposing taxes in 
addition to royalties on the companies. In 1948, a new income tax 
law was passed which taxed the companies' profits a t  the rate of 
50 percent. 
The other oil-exporting nations quickly followed Venezuela's 
example. In 1950, Saudi Arabia became the first Middle Eastern 
government to implement a 50-50 scheme. Within two years, the 
50-50 profit-sharing principle had been grafted onto almost all of 
the world's oil concession agreements. 
The 50-50 profit-sharing scheme was implemented in various 
ways, but the result was essentially the same in each concession 
arrangement. Gross income was generally computed on "posted 
prices," that is, prices published by the companies for f.0.b. sales 
in single-cargo lots. In a few countries such as Libya and Algeria, 
however, gross income was based on realized prices. The com- 
pany's profit was determined by subtracting production costs 
from gross income. Fifty percent of the profit was then paid to the 
government. Any royalties, rents, or other exactions were credited 
against the 50 percent payment, except in Venezuela, where roy- 
alties were treated as an expense rather than a credit against 
taxes. In some states, such as Saudi Arabia, the companies were 
allowed to deduct taxes paid to other governments for purposes 
of calculating their taxable profits. 
During the 1950's, a number of nations enacted comprehen- 
sive petroleum legislation. This legislation prescribed the terms 
upon which various rights relating to hydrocarbon resources 
would be granted. Many of these petroleum codes provided for 
concession agreements-sometimes called an "exploitation li- 
cense" or a "leasew-only in the production stage of operations, 
and limited their duration to 30 or 40 years. In such cases, sepa- 
rate rights were defined and required for surface reconnaissance 
("reconnaissance permits") and for exploration ("exploration li- 
censes"). 
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A new method of royalty payment that allowed the govern- 
ment to take its royalty in "cash or kind" was introduced in the 
Middle East in 1952. In February of that year, Iraq and the Iraq 
Petroleum Company renegotiated their concession agreement to 
reflect the 50-50 profit-sharing principle. The new agreement also 
gave the government the option of taking either 12.5 percent of 
the net oil production, or its cash equivalent based on posted 
prices. This form of royalty soon became standard throughout 
most of the world. 
Several other provisions became commonplace in petroleum 
concession agreements during the 1950's. These included relin- 
quishment provisions, whereby the company agreed to give up 
unexploited parts of the concession area after a stated period of 
time, and provisions requiring that the company make minimum 
expenditures on operations. Also, bonus provisions became more 
substantial and more sophisticated during this period. Typically, 
the newer provisions provided that bonuses be paid (1) at  the 
time the concession agreement was signed, (2) when commercial 
discovery of oil occurred, and (3) when the company reached 
prescribed levels of production. 
The first break from the 50-50 profit-sharing principle oc- 
curred in 1957, when ENI, the Italian state oil company, formed 
a joint company with Iran's NIOC and agreed to pay a 50 percent 
tax on ENI's one-half share of the profits. This arrangement re- 
sulted in an effective 75-25 profit-sharing, with Iran taking the 
larger share. In return, the government agreed to reimburse one- 
half of the exploration and development costs in the event that 
exploration was successful, and to forego the traditional cash 
bonus on the signing of the concession. Shortly thereafter, a Japa- 
nese organization operating as the Arabian Oil Company signed 
a joint venture agreement with Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. In 
1958, Standard of Indiana signed a joint venture agreement with 
Iran, and in 1961, Shell entered into a joint venture agreement 
with Kuwait. A 1965 agreement between Saudi Arabia and a 
subsidiary of ERAP, a French state-owned concern, introduced 
government participation in intergrated operations, including 
refining, transportation, and marketing. 
The 50-50 profit-sharing principle was further eroded when 
the world market prices for refined petroleum products plum- 
meted in 1957, and the oil-exporting nations opposed a correspon- 
ding adjustment in posted prices. At first, the companies agreed 
to keep posted prices at existing levels, and sales to distributors 
were made at  artificially high prices, but in 1960, the companies 
lowered posted prices to reflect world market conditions. As a 
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result of this action, a meeting of oil-exporting nations convened 
in Baghdad on September 5, 1960. This meeting gave birth to 
OPEC, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries. 
Article 2(A) of the Organization's statute sets forth the reason for 
creating OPEC: 
The principal aim of the Organization shall be the coordination 
and unification of the petroleum policies of Member Countries 
and the determination of the best means for safeguarding their 
interests, individually and collectively. 
Within 15 years, relentless pursuit of this objective by OPEC's 
members would totally and unilaterally refashion the legal rela- 
tionships between oil companies and governments of producing 
nations. 
In 1964, OPEC succeeded in its efforts to have royalties 
treated for tax purposes as an expense rather than a credit. As a 
result, the effective profit-sharing ratio increased from 50-50 to 
58-42 in the governments' favor. Nevertheless, the producing gov- 
ernments still recognized in principle 50-50 profit-sharing. Then, 
. in 1970, Libya unequivocally abandoned the 50-50 concept by 
declaring a 55 percent tax and threatening to nationalize any 
company that did not cooperate. At the same time, Libya de- 
manded that the companies increase their posted prices. When 
the companies attempted to negotiate these demands, the gov- 
ernment imposed production cutbacks and ordered them to in- 
crease exploration activity or surrender unexplored parts of their 
concessions. In September of 1970, the companies capitulated to 
the government's demands and, in December of 1970, representa- 
tives of the OPEC nations convened in Caracas to formulate new 
policies based on the Libyan experience. In the same month, 
legislation was introduced in Venezuela to increase the tax rate 
to 60 percent and give the government authority to set tax refer- 
ence prices unilaterally. The Caracas conference was followed by 
the Teheran and Tripoli agreements of 1971, whereby companies 
operating in the Middle East and north Africa-threatened with 
joint reprisals by OPEC members-agreed to a 55 percent tax 
rate and substantially increased posted prices. 
After effectively discarding the 50-50 principle, the oil- 
producing nations moved to achieve participation interests in 
existing concession arrangements. At its September 1971 confer- 
ence in Beirut, OPEC passed a resolution that called upon all 
members to "take immediate steps towards the implementation 
of effective participation in existing oil concessions." On January 
1, 1973, Saudi Arabia, Abu Dhabi, and Qatar signed agreements 
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with their concessionaires whereby the governments acquired a 25 
percent interest in the operations of the concessionaires, with 
% 
options to increase this interest to a maximum of 51 percent by 
1982. By 1974, however, these three governments and others had 
exacted a 60 percent interest from their concessionaires. Aramco 
recently acceded to Saudi Arabia's demand for a 100 percent 
takeover, and Venezuela is in the process of implementing the 
complete nationalization of all foreign petroleum and mining in- 
vestments. The list is constantly legnthening. 
Concession agreements are being replaced by "work con- 
tracts" and "production-sharing contracts." Under both of these 
new government-company relationships, the company, rather 
than being a property owner, is simply a contractor providing the 
capital and expertise necessary for exploration, development, and 
production of the host country's oil reserves. Under the work con- 
tract, the company is granted the right to purchase a certain 
percentage of the oil produced. Under production-sharing con- 
tracts the company receives a percentage of the oil produced, 
rather than the right to buy such a percentage, as under the work 
contract. Title passes to the company a t  the point of export. 
A. Work Contracts 
An example of the work contract is the agreement entered 
into by ERAP and Iran's NIOC on December 12,1966. Under this 
agreement, the company is given the exclusive right to act as 
general contractor for NIOC in the areas specified, but title to all 
petroleum produced vests in NIOC. The company supplies all 
funds necessary to finance exploration operations and, if no com- 
mercial discovery results, bears the full costs of exploration. Fur- 
ther, the company undertakes minimum expenditure obligations, 
which differ for onshore and offshore areas. If the company fails 
to meet these obligations, NIOC may terminate the contract. In 
addition, the company agrees to relinquish certain parts of the 
original contract area during the exploration phase. The relin- 
quishment provisions, like the minimum expenditure provisions, 
differ for onshore and offshore areas. 
In the event of commercial discovery, the company must 
provide the funds necessary to develop the particular field and 
must continue to meet exploration commitments in other parts 
of the contract area. Once commercial production (as defined in 
the agreement) is achieved, however, NIOC is obligated to reim- 
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burse the company for costs incurred in exploration and develop- 
ment operations. Development costs are reimbursed with inter- 
est, but exploration costs are not. Reimbursements of both kinds 
of costs are made over a period of years according to formulas 
prescribed by the agreement. 
Commercial production also obligates NIOC to pay for a per- 
centage of the operating costs out of an operating fund estab- 
lished when commercial production is achieved. This fund is fi- 
nanced by contributions from NIOC and the company, each 
party contributing amounts in proportion to the percentage of 
production to which it is entitled. 
Fifty percent of the recoverable reserves discovered by the 
company are set aside as national reserves on a field-by-field 
basis. These reserves are then excluded from further development 
by the company under the terms of the agreement. 
The principal benefit accruing to the company under its 
agreement with NIOC is a guaranteed right to purchase for 25 
years a certain percentage of the oil produced from fields other 
than those set aside as national reserves. This percentage varies 
from 35 percent to 45 percent depending on the distance between 
the particular field and the export terminal. The price paid is the 
sum of (1) the amortized per barrel cost of exploration, develop- 
ment, and production, (2) 2 percent of this amortized cost, and 
(3) 50 percent of the difference between the cost per barrel and 
the realized price per barrel based on current f.0.b. prices in the 
Persian Gulf. 
Under the terms of the agreement, the company does not pay 
taxes, although the price increment amounting to 50 percent of 
the difference between cost and selling price may be likened to a 
tax, since it is paid to NIOC, a government agency. NIOC itself 
is liable for taxation in accordance with the provisions of its stat- 
utes. 
With respect to NIOC's share of the production, the com- 
pany is obligated to sell certain amounts as specified in the con- 
tract. General management responsibility vests in the company, 
but production levels are determined jointly by the company and 
NIOC. The NIOC-ERAP work contract also contains standard 
import, arbitration, and force majeure clauses similar to those 
contained in most concession agreements. 
B. Production-Sharing Contracts 
An example of the production-sharing contract is the 1973 
agreement between Indonesia's PERTAMINA and Mobile Petro- 
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leum Indonesia, Inc. This 30-year contract covers an offshore area 
in the Macassar Strait. Under this contract, as under the work 
contract discussed above, the company is granted the exclusive 
right to act as a general contractor for the state oil company 
within the contract area. PERTAMINA holds title to oil in the 
ground and at the well-head and is responsible for the manage- 
ment of operations undertaken pursuant to the agreement. The 
company agrees to furnish all funds, equipment, and technical 
expertise necessary to conduct exploration, development, and 
production operations. In return, the company is entitled to re- 
ceive a share of the oil produced and to recover all of its operating 
costs-including exploration, -development, extraction, produc- 
tion, transportation, and marketing costs-out of a percentage of 
the production which may not exceed 40 percent of the crude oil 
won and saved. Of the production remaining after the reimburse- 
ment of operating costs, the company is entitled to take-not 
purchase, as in the work contract-35 percent of the daily produc- 
tion where such production does not exceed 100,000 barrels per 
day; 32.5 percent of daily production greater than 100,000 barrels 
per day but not more than 150,000 barrels per day; and 30 percent 
of daily production in excess of 150,000 barrels per day. Title to 
the company's share of the production passes at the point of 
export. PERTAMINA's corresponding shares of production after 
reimbursement of operating cost are 65 percent, 67.5 percent, and 
70 percent. PERTAMINA is obligated to pay the company's In- 
donesian income tax out of PERTAMINA's share of the produc- 
tion. 
The agreement limits the company in several other signifi- 
cant ways. For example, the company is obligated to sell to PER- 
TAMINA part of its share of production for the domestic market 
in Indonesia at a price of $0.20 per barrel. The amount of oil that 
the company must sell to PERTAMINA is determined by a num- 
ber of variables and may in some cases exceed 41 percent of the 
company's share of production. Also, if the company's share of 
production reaches 200,000 barrels per day, it is obligated to re- 
fine 10 percent of its production in Indonesia if requested to do 
so by PERTAMINA. If there is no refining capacity for this pur- 
pose, the company must establish such refining capacity in Indo- 
nesia or, with PERTAMINA's permission, make an equivalent 
investment in another project related to the petroleum or petro- 
chemical industries. Further, a t  any time within 3 months from 
the date of the first discovery in the contract area, PERTAMINA 
may demand that the company offer a 10 percent undivided in- 
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terest in the rights and obligations accming under the contract 
to an Indonesian entity, in return for which the company will 
receive a specified compensation. Finally, the company agrees to 
undertake certain minimum expenditures for exploration during 
the first 10 years. The company also agrees to relinquish large 
parts of the contract area during that same period. In the event 
that commercial production is not achieved, the company must 
bear the entire loss, as under the work contract. 
VI. FUTURE ARRANGEMENTS 
To the extent that the oil-producing nations do not establish 
their own oil-producing industries, they will remain dependent 
upon foreign oil companies for the expertise and, in many instan- 
ces, the capital required to develop their petroleum resources. In 
order to attract this expertise and capital, the oil-producing na- 
tions will have to offer the companies some reasonable incentive. 
The incentives and terms under which the companies will con- 
tinue to operate are considerably different, however, from those 
which prevailed during the first half of this century. 
The trend has been away from the concession concept and 
toward joint ventures, participation arrangements, or outright 
government ownership with the company acting as a service con- 
tractor. Putting form aside for the moment, however, there is 
little practical difference between the concession concept, the 
joint venture, the participation arrangement, the work contract, 
and the production-sharing contract. This is especially true when 
the government has the power to unilaterally alter whatever ar- 
rangement is in force. In all five types of arrangements, the com- 
pany contracts with the government to provide the capital and 
expertise required to develop the host country's petroleum re- 
sources in return for a right to a share of the production. It is true 
that concessions generally contained terms more favorable to the 
companies than do the joint venture and participation arrange- 
ments, work contracts, and production-sharing contracts in force 
today. This results, however, from the change that has occurred 
in the relative bargaining positions of the companies and the 
governments, not because the concession concept is inherently 
any more favorable to the companies than the other kinds of 
agreements. 
It is also true that the concession vested in the company a 
property right, and that this property right was diminished by the 
advent of joint venture and participation arrangements, and en- 
tirely eliminated by the work contract and the production- 
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sharing contract. As a practical matter, however, this property 
right proved to be largely illusory, since it could be effectively 
defeated by the host government by the enactment of increased 
tax rates on the company's operations. 
In the final analysis, what is important is how much oil the 
company is allowed to take away from its operations and a t  what 
cost. Whether its right to this oil is characterized as a "contract 
right" or a "property right" is less important than the amount of 
profits that the right produces. These profits do not depend on 
the nature or the type of agreement as much as they depend upon 
the specific terms of the agreement; one company operating 
under a work contract may have higher profits than another com- 
pany operating under a concession. 
Why, then, was there a shift away from the concession con- 
cept? The answer appears to be that oil-producing nations oper- 
ating under the concession system desired to achieve de jure as 
well as de facto control over their natural resources. Under the 
concession system, the company was given control of the develop- 
ment of resources within the concession area; the company could 
produce as much or as little oil as it wanted and had title to all 
of the oil it produced. The property right that vested in the com- 
pany under the concession concept implied the absence of a prop- 
erty right in the government and a corresponding absence of con- 
trol. This apparent absence of control on the part of the govern- 
ment, however, proved to be just as illusory as the company's 
property right, as illustrated by the unilateral tax increases and 
production cutbacks in Libya in 1970. 
Nevertheless, the ostensible relinquishment of control of nat- 
ural resources had an adverse psychological effect on those gov- 
ernments operating under the concession system. The importance 
to the oil-producing countries of retaining control over their nat- 
ural resources is evidenced by the Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, passed as a resolution of the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1975. 
Article 2 of this charter provides: 
(1) Every State has and shall freely exercise full perma- 
nent sovereignty, including possession, use and disposal, over all 
its wealth, natural resources and economic activities. 
(2) Each State has the right: 
(a) To regulate and exercise authority over foreign 
investment within its national jurisdiction in accord- 
ance with its laws and regulations and in conformity 
with its national objectives and priorities. No State 
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shall be compelled to grant preferential treatment to 
foreign investment; 
(b) To regulate and supervise the  activities of 
transnational corporations within its national jurisdic- 
tion and take measures to ensure that such activities 
comply with its laws, rules and regulations and conform 
with its economic and social policies. Transnational cor- 
porations shall not intervene in the internal affairs of a 
host State. Every State should, with full regard for its 
sovereign rights, co-operate with other States in the ex- 
ercise of the right set forth in this subparagraph; 
(c) To nationalize, expropriate or transfer owner- 
ship of foreign property in which case appropriate com- 
pensation should be paid by the State adopting such 
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and reg- 
ulations and all circumstances that the State considers 
pertinent. In any case where the question of compensa- 
tion gives rise to a controversy, i t  shall be settled under 
the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its 
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all 
States concerned that other peaceful means be sought 
on the basis of the sovereign equality of States and in 
accordance with the principle of free choice of means.28 
Taken literally, such policies would bring foreign investments to 
a halt. The oil-exporting and mineral-exporting nations have ex- 
pressed similar sentiments in numerous other forums. Obviously, 
the notion of a property right vesting in a foreign oil company, 
with corresponding rights of control, is not compatible with this 
kind of sentiment. The elimination of the company's property 
right-the theoretical cornerstone of the concession concept- 
was an  effort by the oil-producing nations to reassert control 
over their own natural resources. 
If the transition from the concession concept to other forms 
of government-company relationships was, in and of itself, one of 
form rather than substance, what were the underlying substan- 
tive changes that accompanied this transition? As already indi- 
cated, the major change occasioned by this transition was a shift 
in control of the development of the natural resources from the 
companies to the governments. More specifically, it was a shift 
from the companies to the governments of the power to (1) control 
production, and (2) control prices. Under the concession system, 
the governments for many years enjoyed neither of these powers. 
28. G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc. A19631 (1974). 
34 BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [1976: 
But by the beginning of the present decade, the situation had 
changed. Joint venture agreements had been in effect since 1957, 
and work contracts and production-sharing contracts were imple- 
mented during the 1960's. The OPEC resolution calling for mem- 
bers to take immediate steps toward the implementation of effec- 
tive participation in existing oil concessions was passed in Sep- 
tember of 1971, and participation was implemented in early 1973. 
Even prior to this time, certain of the OPEC nations had demon- 
strated their power to effectively control both prices and produc- 
tion. For example, in 1970, when Libya unilaterally increased its 
tax rate to 55 percent and ordered the companies to increase their 
posted prices, the government successfully imposed production 
cutbacks in order to force the companies to comply. This exercise 
of control over prices and production occurred under a concession 
system in which the Libyan government had no participation 
interest. 
In light of the foregoing, several observations can be made 
with respect to the probable form that  future government- 
company relationships will take. First, it is clear that the conces- 
sion system is being phased out. The property rights and control 
of operations traditionally associated with that system are inher- 
ently a t  odds with the nationalistic sentiment that characterizes 
the developing nations. Future relationships will almost certainly 
be in the form of joint ventures or participation agreements, with 
the government holding the controlling interest, or service con- 
tracts. But, as already mentioned, the type of agreement is not 
nearly as important as the specific terms, and these terms will be 
a direct reflection of the respective bargaining powers of the com- 
panies and the governments. Where competition among foreign 
oil companies for oil rights in a particular area is high, it can be 
assumed that the terms offered by the host government will not 
be as favorable to the company as where there is little or no 
competition. Also, where the oil-producing nation has an estab- 
lished national oil industry and indigenous sources of capital, the 
need for foreign assistance will be less, and the terms offered to 
foreign companies will be correspondingly less favorable than 
those offered by a country that does not have an established 
national oil industry or the capital necessary to develop its re- 
sources. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
This essay has discussed changes. One unchanging reality 
merits emphasis, however: until such time as the oil-producing 
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nations of the world acquire the technology to develop their petro- 
leum resources, they will remain dependent on foreign oil compa- 
nies for that purpose. In the meantime, the Hoover's prophetic 
words of 60 years ago describing the ebb and flow of the forces at 
work between the state, the community (the consumer), the 
landowner, and the miner remain true today-the miner is buf- 
feted among them all and is saved only by the need of the other 
three for his expertise. 
